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INTRODUCTION
Even in a tumultuous year for our national politics, with the
transition of federal government control uncharacteristically caustic, a
single episode on the floor of the United States Senate chamber is
remarkable for its acrimony. On February 7, 2017, Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell rose and cited an arcane Senate rule to halt
Senator Elizabeth Warren’s reading from a letter written more than three
decades ago.1 Senator Warren was addressing the Senate in opposition
to the nomination of her Senate colleague, Jeff Sessions of Alabama, to
the post of Attorney General of the United States.2 The letter from which
Senator Warren read had been composed by Coretta Scott King, the
widow of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in opposition to Senator
Sessions’ prior nomination for a federal judgeship, in 1986.3
Senator McConnell’s objection came swiftly and conjured a littleknown and seldom used Senate rule prohibiting any Senator from
“directly or indirectly, by any form of words, imput[ing] to another
Senator or to other Senators any conduct or motive unworthy or
unbecoming a Senator.”4 By invoking the rule, Senator McConnell
effectively silenced Senator Warren’s attack, as she was instructed by
the presiding officer to be seated, in accordance with the rule’s
provisions.5 The episode further enflamed heightened passions on both
sides of the political aisle.6
1. See generally Matt Flegenheimer, Republican Senators Vote to Formally Silence
Elizabeth Warren, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), https ://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/poli
tics/republ ican-senators-vote-to-formally-silence-elizabeth-warren.html.
2. Id.
3. A full copy of the letter is available in Read the Letter Elizabeth Warren Got Rebuked
for Reading, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics
/2017/02/07/read-letter-elizabeth-warren-got-rebuked-for-reading/Nr9jICetEMk5JZtnmP6t
UI/st ory.html.
4. S. Res. 285, 113th Cong. Rule XIX (2013) (enacted).
5. See generally Ted Barrett and Manu Raju, Rule 19: Senate GOP defends rebuking
Warren with obscure action, CNN (Feb. 9, 2017) (describing the actions as they transpired in
the Senate chamber), https://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/08/politics/senate-rule-19explained/index.html.
6. See, e.g., Matt Viser & Victoria McGrane, Senate rebukes Warren after reading
Coretta Scott King letter, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
news/politics/2017/02/07/warren-violates-arcane-rule-sparking-senate-dustup/l1quKU944r
f5Ltp0AGO3IK/story.html (observing that “[t]he debate in the Senate was yet another sign of
how toxic the political atmosphere has become,” and describing the ignited political reaction
following the episode); Matt Flegenheimer, Shutting Down Speech by Elizabeth Warren,
G.O.P. Amplifies Her Message, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2
017/02/08/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-coretta-scott-king.html (arguing that “[f]or Ms.
Warren’s supporters, it was the latest and most visceral example of a woman muzzled by men
who seemed unwilling to listen”); Jessica Valenti, Elizabeth Warren won’t be silenced – and
neither will American women, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2017) (“American women simply won’t
stand for Republicans trying to shut us up.”). Cf. Daniel Reagan Diggins, Triumph Of The
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Absent from the emotional and partisan reaction to the
parliamentary tactic was a broader appreciation for the colorful history
of Rule XIX, a survey of its prior invocations or an objective analysis of
its limitations and shortcomings. More troubling, the acerbic political
climate stymied any constructive inquiry into the efficacy of a Senate
rule of decorum being employed to limit the Senate’s Constitutionally
prescribed advice and consent function with respect to an executive
branch nominee. This Article seeks to fill that void, and to provide a
broader framework to balance the proper inquiry into the fitness of
executive nominees chosen from within the Senate with the maintenance
of Senatorial gentility.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly examines the
history and philosophy of the advice and consent power enshrined in the
Constitution and vested in the United States Senate. Because much has
been written on this subject and the Article does not endeavor to add to
that scholarship, this Part serves as a simple survey. Part II examines the
tradition of Senate decorum, with an emphasis on the history and intent
of Senate Rule XIX. This rule has been invoked infrequently and it is
little examined. Unsurprisingly, it is the subject of very little
scholarship. Any recounting of the events surrounding the use of Rule
XIX to thwart Senator Warren’s attack, and thus limit debate on the
nomination of Senator Sessions, eschews the politics or merits of the
particular nomination altogether. Instead, the Article addresses the
recent episode solely to highlight the potential conflict between the
Rule’s application and the Constitutional power granted to the Senate in
the instance where the executive nominates a sitting senator for a post
requiring advice and consent. Part III is the Article’s main contribution,
suggesting several potential arrangements by which the Senate might
anticipate and better navigate a similar episode in the future. This
section of the Article seeks a solution faithful to the maintenance of
civility within the Senate chamber, yet supportive of the Senate’s
Constitutional responsibility to ensure the proper investigation of the

Turtle: Why Mitch McConnell Is Already On Top of It All, MEDIUM (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://medium.com/@DVNC112/triumph-of-the-turtle-why-mitch-mcconnell-is-alreadyon-top-a98cd02b0f25 (admiring that Senator McConnell “whipped-out Rule XIX of the
Standing Rules of the Senate like Wyatt Earp, and with lightning speed has shown everyone
where to find the real sheriff of Washington D.C.”); James I. Wallner, How to Use Senate
Rules to Break Supreme Court filibuster, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://www.heritage.org/political-process/commentary/how-use-senate-rules-breaksupreme-court-filibuster (suggesting that Senator McConnell’s invocation of Rule XIX would
“neither jeopardize the legislative filibuster nor unduly empower the majority to limit the
rights of individual senators more broadly,” but would “accomplish the objective of
confirming the president’s nominee”).
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merits of a sitting senator nominated for an executive post. Finally, the
Article offers a brief conclusion.
I. THE SENATE’S ADVICE AND CONSENT POWER
As the Framers gathered in Philadelphia, in the summer of 1787,
they were grounded in the political philosophy of the Enlightenment7
and infused with a healthy dose of government mistrust.8 King George
III had proven to be an unpopular monarch.9 The colonists’ experience
with the unified and unchecked power of a king had proven
unsatisfactory. It had led the men assembled to conclude that “the
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands . . . [was] the very definition of tyranny.”10
Yet, the struggles of the new nation under the Articles of
Confederation had been significant.11 Those difficulties ensured that the
first order for many Framers would not be focused on checking the
authority of the executive.12 The drafters of the state constitutions had
each reduced their respective executives to “essentially figureheads.”13
And, in his notes of the debates of the federal Convention, James
7. For two favorite articulations of the philosophy, see JOHN LOCKE , THE TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 3d ed. 1965) (arguing that a division between
the legislative and executive powers is fundamental and necessary to secure the liberty of the
people); and CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS
(Prometheus Books rev. ed. 2002) (identifying the legislative, executive and judicial powers
of government and outlining the basis for the separation of powers).
8. See, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, “Advice and Consent” in the Appointments Clause:
From Another Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE L.J. 173, 176 (2015) (“The Framers also were
influenced by writers such as Thomas Paine, who asserted that the government should be
mistrusted regardless of the source of its power.”); see also MATTHEW E. GLASSMAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R44334, SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN OVERVIEW 2-3 (2016) (arguing that
the preferences of the colonists were “chiefly shaped by two things: the political philosophy
of the colonial Americans, and their actual political experiences as English colonists”),
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc824814/m2/1/high_res_d/R44334_2016Jan0
8.pdf.
9. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). (“[t]he history
of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having
in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.”).
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
11. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton) (“There is scarcely
anything that can wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which
we do not experience.”).
12. Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
701, 768-69; see also GLASSMAN, supra note 8, at 7 (“The failure of the Articles of
Confederation as a national governing document further eroded belief in government by
legislature alone.”).
13. DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 148
(1988); see also Prakash, supra note 12, at 756 (“State legislatures seized executive authority
from royal governors and wielded that authority themselves.”).
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Madison describes the executives of the states as being of no influence
compared to the omnipotent legislatures.14 But, “[t]he weak and servile
state and continental executives served as examples to avoid in the
construction of the chief executive.”15 Informed by the frustrations
endured under the fledgling system of legislative supremacy favored by
the Articles of Confederation, most Framers “understood that a
powerful, independent executive was necessary to ensure vigorous,
efficient, and responsible law execution.”16 With so much at stake,
considerable detail and great passion attended the deliberations on the
extent of the powers to reside in the executive of the general
government.17 Chief among the President’s powers was the selection of
the nation’s officers.18 After due consideration of several alternatives,
the Framers coalesced around “an appointments default rule for all
officers: the president must appoint, and the Senate must confirm.”19
A. The Constitutional Basis of the Appointments Clause
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution articulates the
process for the appointment of officers of the United States, reading, in
relevant part:
The President . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law . . .20

“[T]he Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of
‘etiquette or protocol’; it is among the significant structural safeguards

14. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
312 (W.W. Norton 1987) (1840).
15. Prakash, supra note 12, at 768.
16. Id. at 769 (“Most delegates understood that execution required vigor, dispatch, and
attentiveness, qualities inconsistent with legislative supremacy.”).
17. See generally Louis J. Sirico, Jr., How the Separation of Powers Doctrine Shaped
the Executive, Villanova Working Paper Series (2008) (examining in detail the debates of the
Founders over the separation of powers doctrine as it relates to the executive branch),
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1122&context=wps.
18. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (observing that “the
true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration”).
19. Prakash, supra note 12, at 733; see also James D. King and James W. Riddlesperger,
Jr., Senate Confirmation of Cabinet Appointments: Congress-centered, Presidency-centered,
and Nominee-centered Explanations, W. POL. SCI. ASS’N (Apr. 2011) (“After extensive
discussion, delegates at the Constitutional Convention favoring a strong executive and those
preferring legislative supremacy agreed upon a method to serve the concerns of both sides:
appointment by the president with the Senate’s concurrence.”).
20. U.S. CONST., art II, §2.
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of the constitutional scheme.”21 “Debates over the Appointments
Clause, at the Constitutional Convention, focused on devising a structure
that would maintain both accountability for appointments and a check
on the Executive’s concentrated power.”22 And, there is ample evidence
that the Framers intentionally chose a governmental structure more
prone to obstruction than comparable systems.23 Article II’s process for
appointments represents the Framers’ purposeful bifurcation of
governmental function through separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances.24 The design maintains efficiency, yet diversifies
power, thereby limiting the possibilities for governmental abuse.25 In
this regard, the structure reflects a conscious choice of the Framers to
both constrain and diffuse governmental power.26
The two-branch process of appointment and confirmation settled on
at the Constitutional Convention is but one manifestation of the broader
separation of powers construct. The Framers adopted the proposal
offered by New Hampshire delegate Nathaniel Gorham and “modeled
after the judicial appointments clause of the Massachusetts Constitution,
in which officers would be appointed by the executive with the advice
and consent of the Senate.”27 The scheme not only serves as a check on
the concentration of governmental power. It is also a nod to the idea that
“power flows from the people to the government, rather than the other

21. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
22. Congressional Restrictions on the President's Appointment Power and the Role of
Longstanding Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1914, 1917 (May
2007) [hereinafter Congressional Restrictions].
23. See Russell L. Weaver, “Advice and Consent” in Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE
L.J. 1717, 1753 (2015) (observing that the Framers preferred “a governmental structure that
was more cumbersome and less efficient than competing governmental systems”); see also
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 140 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Library of America 2004) (remarking that “the power of the president of the United States is
exercised only within the sphere of limited sovereignty, whereas that of the king of France
acts within the circle of full sovereignty”).
24. John T. Plecnik, Officers Under the Appointments Clause, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 201,
208 (2014) (noting that “the Founders authored the Appointments Clause as a safeguard for
the separation of powers”); see also Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)
(acknowledging that the “roots of the separation-of-powers concept embedded in the
Appointments Clause are structural and political”).
25. Weaver, supra note 23, at 1721.
26. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To this union of the Senate
with the President, in the article of appointments, it has in some cases been suggested that it
would serve to give the President an undue influence over the Senate and in others that it
would have an opposite tendency, a strong proof that neither suggestion is true.”).
27. See Congressional Restrictions, supra note 22, at 1917; see also William Grayson
Lambert, The Real Debate Over the Senate’s Role in the Confirmation Process, 61 DUKE L.
J. 1283, 1300-01 (2012) (describing the facts surrounding the Convention’s adoption of “an
‘advice and consent’ scheme much like the one Gorham had proposed”).
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way around.”28 Too, the appointments process mirrors other parts of
state function which foster interdependency – requiring the cooperation
of more than one branch of government. As one commentator has noted,
“most powers granted under the Constitution are not unilateral for any
one branch; instead they overlap.”29
The Senate’s advice and consent regime and its necessary
cooperative competence was born of several rounds of design, re-design
and refinement.30 As one scholar describes,
[d]uring the debates, a variety of other modes of appointment—
including presidential appointment, senatorial appointment, and
presidential appointment subject to a discretionary Senate veto—
were discussed and sometimes initially accepted. Eventually, all
were rejected.31

The advice and consent mechanism, “makes a firm distinction
between the power of nomination and the power of appointment.”32 The
President’s choice of candidate is the emphasis of appointments process,
and its catalyst, as the Framers believed that “[t]he sole and undivided
responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and
a more exact regard to reputation.”33 The Senate’s role is secondary; as
it is limited to “see[ing] that no unfit person be employed,”34 yet is
28. Weaver, supra note 23, at 1724; Friedland, supra note 8, at 176 (“[P]hilosophers such
as Baron de Montesquieu contributed to the Constitution’s central idea that the legitimacy of
governmental power is derived from the people, from the bottom up, and not from the top
down, as with divine right.”); see also Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal
Structures: The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249,
293 (1997) (“The real innovation under the Constitution was that the general government
depended at all for its authority on the people.”).
29. See GLASSMAN, supra note 8, at Summary (other examples of the overlapping
responsibilities of the branches include the presidential veto power over legislation, the
judicial power to review actions of Congress or the President and the Congressional power
(by supermajority) to remove judges or the president from office); id. at 1.
30. See generally Joseph Larisa, Jr., Popular Mythology: The Framers’ Intent, the
Constitution, and the Ideological Review of Supreme Court Nominees, 30 B.C. L. REV. 969,
978-79 (1989) (discussing the process of appointment for federal judges and observing that
“the Convention as a whole was very much undecided on the proper method of appointment
until its unanimous decision in September to place it in the hands of the President”).
31. Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and Consent”: An
Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 104, 110.
32. Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for
Federal Officers, 10 U. Pa. J. CONST. L. 745, 752.
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton); see also DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 23, at 146 (“The Americans rightly judged that in order for the chief executive to carry
out his mission and bear full responsibility for his actions, he ought to be left as free as possible
to choose his own agents and to dismiss them at will.”).
34. THOMAS JEFFERSON, OPINION ON THE POWERS OF THE SENATE RESPECTING
DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS (Apr. 24, 1790) reprinted in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 378, 379 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961).
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intended as an “excellent check upon the spirit of favoritism in the
President.”35 The structure fosters an interdependence between the two
branches,36 wholly consistent with the larger foundational doctrine of
separation of powers attributable to Baron de Montesquieu.37
B. The Purpose of the Appointments Clause
Commentators have identified “four related but distinct purposes of
the Appointments Clause.”38 As designed, the Appointments Clause (i)
prevents a single branch from creating and filling the same governmental
office, (ii) protects the President’s appointment prerogative, (iii) ensures
political accountability, and (iv) strives for a higher quality of
appointments.39
The Constitution’s qualification of advice and consent checks the
unfettered selections of the executive and “eliminates the singular
viewpoint and its impulsiveness and susceptibility to a lack of
questioning, and instead values the idea of freedom of speech and
differing viewpoints—of the Senate and the President, at least—and also
emulates an adversary system of truthseeking.”40 Convinced that a
successful system of government must diffuse and divide authority, the
Framers embraced the concept of separation of powers, hoping to avoid
the concentration of unbridled appointment power in any single person
or entity.41 As Madison more generally described the theory’s
importance, “[a]n independence of the three great departments of each
other, as far as possible, and the responsibility of all to the will of the
35. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton); see also DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 23, at 136 (“The Senate has the power to nullify certain presidential actions, but it cannot
force him to act or share executive power with him.”).
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Those who can best estimate the
value of a steady administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision which connects
the official existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body which,
from the greater permanency of its own composition, will in all probability be less subject to
inconstancy than any other member of the government.”).
37. Weaver, supra note 23, at 1724-25; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James
Madison) (commenting that “[t]he British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has
been to the didactic writers of epic poetry” and commenting that, under the British
Constitution, “the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally
separate and distinct from each other”).
38. See, e.g., Plecnik, supra note 24, at 208 (quoting Tucker v. Commissioner, 135 T.C.
114, 120 (2010)).
39. See Plecnik, supra note 24, at 209-10 (summarizing the design intention of the
Founders).
40. Friedland, supra note 8, at 177.
41. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (commenting that “where the
whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are
subverted”).
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community seemed to be generally admitted as the true basis of a well
constructed government.”42 The constitutional reformers seized on this
maxim and “exploited it with a sweeping intensity and eventually
magnified it into the dominant principle of the American political
system.”43 The design also respects the primacy of a Presidential choice,
“prevent[ing] congressional encroachment upon the Executive and
Judicial Branches,”44 as “[n]o role whatsoever is given either to the
Senate or to Congress as a whole in the process of choosing the person
who will be nominated for appointment.”45
The appointments process for federal officials is designed “as a
shared power held jointly by the President and the Senate.”46 The
structure seeks to maximize efficiency, yet remains skeptical of
undiluted power.47 And, the fact that, at times in our nation’s history,
nominations have been “difficult and contentious should come as no
great surprise.”48 Similar to many other constitutional powers,
government appointments is a mutual power—requiring a level of
cooperation and coordination of two separate branches of the federal
government.49 That such cooperation will always be forthcoming is by
no means assured.50 By bifurcating the appointment and confirmation
42. MADISON, supra note 14 at 313.
43. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 449
(1969).
44. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
45. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 483 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment).
46. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power After Noel Canning, 64
DUKE L.J. 1513, 1521.
47. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is not easy to conceive a plan
better calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the
Union; and it will not need proof, that on this point must essentially depend the character of
its administration.”).
48. Weaver, supra note 23, at 1721. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander
Hamilton) (“in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men,
we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities
and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the
assembly.”).
49. See Jonathan Turley, Constitutional Adverse Possession: Recess Appointments and
the Role of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 965, 973
(describing the Framers’ decision to enshrine power jointly in the president and the Senate);
see also Krotoszynski, supra note 46, at 1522 (referring to the powers as “blended, rather than
clearly separated, powers”).
50. While the President has the power to nominate federal judges, ambassadors and
officers, such nominees are of no governmental import until they gain confirmation following
the “advice and consent” of the Senate. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, The Senate Has No
Constitutional Obligation to Consider Nominees, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 15, 18 (2016)
(arguing that Senator McConnell’s across-the-board opposition to any Supreme Court
nominee following the death of Justice Scalia might be “unwise and imprudent,” but is not
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powers in separately elected entities, the Constitution encourages a
system where political influences must be successfully navigated to
achieve confirmation.51 Such a process ensures at least a modicum of
political accountability.52
The genius of the Appointments Clause design and its ability to
encourage high quality appointments for executive offices is
summarized by one scholar:
The brilliance of this appointments interdependence elides a simple
rationale of distrust of government. It pushes beyond the mere fact
that each branch is elected, or that overlapping duties force different
factions to engage in a dialogue, if not directly, even to the extent of
becoming a team of rivals, however begrudgingly. Just knowing that
there will be examination and inspection ought to be enough to
modify the behavior of the participants, from the Executive who
nominates and does not want embarrassment or rejection, to the
nominees themselves, and to the Senate.53

II. THE TRADITION OF SENATE DECORUM
A. Jefferson’s Contribution
From its earliest days, the Senate codified Thomas Jefferson’s view
that “[p]arliamentary bodies require written rules of order if their
proceedings are to be conducted fairly and efficiently.”54 The world’s
most deliberative body55 has since maintained an expanding list of rules
governing civility and decorum within its chamber.56 When he acceded
unconstitutional); Krotoszynski, supra note 46, at 1523, 1524 (commenting, in the context of
appointments, that the “Framers obviously understood that inaction could lead to gridlock”
and adding that “the Senate is free to reject presidential nominations through inaction”).
51. Weaver, supra note 23, at 1722.
52. Id.
53. Friedland, supra note 8, at 177.
54. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF
THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES v (U.S. Government Printing Office 1993) (1801),
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SDoc103-8.pdf.
55. For an exegesis on the use of the description of the Senate as “the world’s greatest
deliberative body,” see Barry Popik, World’s Greatest Deliberative Body (U.S. Senate
nickname), THE BIG APPLE (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/ new_yo
rk_city/entry/worlds_greatest_deliberative_body_us_senate_nickname/; see also Horace
Towner, Our Somnolent Senate: Dignity and Deliberation Hedge the Proceedings of
America’s Elder Statesmen, 58 MUNSEY’S MAGAZINE 72 (1916) (“Most of the time the
‘upper house’ is first of all a deliberative, a very deliberative body.”); Remarks by Senator
Robert Byrd at the Orientation of New Senators, UNITED STATES SENATE (Dec. 3, 1996),
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Feature_Homepage_ByrdOri
entation.htm [hereinafter Remarks by Senator Robert Byrd].
56. Derek Hawkins, The Silencing of Elizabeth Warren and an Old Senate Rule
Prompted by a Fistfight, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/new
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to his position as the second Vice President of the United States, and, as
such, the Senate’s second president, Jefferson was aware that his
predecessor, John Adams, “had been severely criticized for his
inconsistent and subjective manner while presiding” over the Senate.57
Committed to avoiding such criticism, Jefferson believed that the
Senate’s presiding officer must abide by “some known system of rules”
and “that he may neither leave himself free to indulge caprice or passion,
nor open to the imputation of them.”58 Well trained in parliamentary
practice, and eager to carefully delineate norms to avoid a Senate prone
to extremes, Jefferson set about crafting a manual of legislative
procedure to guide the Senate’s affairs.59
Jefferson’s work culminated in his Manual of Parliamentary
Practice for the Use of the Senate of the United States, which included
specific references to the applicable text of the U.S. Constitution and was
arranged in fifty-three categories, with twenty-three sections devoted to
the management of bills.60 Primarily concerned with the minutiae of the
legislative process, the Manual also addressed the behavioral
expectation of the Senate’s members. Jefferson devoted several parts of
his guidance to issues of how senators were to conduct their affairs, both
in and out of the Senate chamber.
Among the protections the Manual accorded members of the upper
chamber was an assurance against “having their persons assaulted, or
characters traduced.”61 A lengthier section of the Manual, concerning
“Order in Debate,” outlines basic principles of decorum and rules of
conduct. For example, section 17.11 concerns the now familiar manner
in which Senators should engage fellow members and offers baseline
proprieties, providing that
[n]o person in speaking, is to mention a member then present by his
name; but to describe him by his seat in the house, or who spoke last,
or on the other side of the question, nor to digress from the matter to
fall upon the person by speaking reviling, nipping, or unmannerly
words against a particular member.62

s/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/08/the-silencing-of-elizabeth-warren-and-an-old-senate-ruleprompted-by-a-fistfight/?utm_term=.03d1a5857b99.
57. JEFFERSON, supra note 54, at vi; see also No Hissing, UNITED STATES SENATE (Feb.
27, 1801), https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/No_Hissing.htm [hereinafter
No Hissing] (“[D]espite Adams’ knowledge, senators routinely criticized him for his arbitrary
and inconsistent parliamentary rulings.”).
58. JEFFERSON, supra note 54, at vi.
59. Id. at vii.
60. Id. at viii.
61. Id. §3.1, at 3.
62. Id. §17.11, at 27 (internal citations omitted).
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Concerned that even the best legislatures could devolve into a mob
absent proper standards of orderliness,63 the section provided further that
“[w]hen a member shall be called to order he shall sit down until the
president shall have determined whether he is in order or not.”64 Finally,
section 17.12 added that “[n]o one is to disturb another in his speech by
hissing, coughing, spitting, speaking or whispering to another.”65 The
rules established baseline restrictions and signaled broad guidelines for
proper behavior within the upper chamber of the nation’s legislature.
Well aware that reactions to individual episodes of behavioral
transgression within the Senate chamber were likely to be subjective and
that comity would be tested at moments of heightened passion, Jefferson
took care to outline a detailed process to reach judgments on civility. In
a procedure which presages today’s Rule XIX, the Manual provided that:
[d]isorderly words are not to be noticed till the member has finished
his speech. Then the person objecting to them, and desiring them to
be taken down by the clerk at the table, must repeat them. The
Speaker then may direct the clerk to take them down in his
minutes.66

Although the Senate traditionally has not considered Jefferson’s
Manual as a direct authority on parliamentary practice, the work has
retained an influence fundamental to Senate proceedings.67 In 1888, the
Senate first began publishing a compilation of laws, rules and regulation
known as the Senate Manual, a book which continues to guide the
operations of the body today.68 The Senate has regularly published the
Manual alongside Senate rules.69
In February 1801, after Thomas Jefferson was informed that he had
been elected President of the United States, he bade farewell to the
Senate over which he had presided, offering an observation as he parted:
I owe to truth and justice . . . to declare that the habits of order and
decorum, which so strongly characterize the proceedings of the
Senate, have rendered the umpirage of their President an office of
63. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison) (“In all very numerous
assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from
reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have
been a mob.”).
64. JEFFERSON, supra note 54, §17.11, at 28 (internal citations omitted).
65. Id. §17.12, at 28.
66. Id. §17.16, at 29 (internal citations omitted).
67. See No Hissing, supra note 57 (“Jefferson’s Manual, with its emphasis on order and
decorum, changed the way the Senate of his day operated.”).
68. JEFFERSON, supra note 54, at xiii; see S. COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., 133TH
CONG., S. MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS
(2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/SMAN-113/pdf/SMAN-113.pdf.
69. Id.
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little difficulty; that, in times and on questions which have severely
tried the sensibilities of the house, calm and temperate discussion has
rarely been disturbed by departures from order.70

B. Senate Comity is Tested
As he exited the Senate chamber, the Gentleman from Virginia
could not have foreseen the rancor that would befall his beloved
legislative body in the years to follow. Nor could he predict the “seismic
cultural, technological and political adjustments” on the horizon or the
profound effect they would have on the dysfunction of the appointments
process.71 Little more than a half century after Jefferson departed the
Senate, the deterioration began in earnest, when in “one of the most
dramatic and deeply ominous moments in the Senate’s entire history,” a
Congressman entered the upper chamber and “savagely beat a senator
into unconsciousness.”72
On May 22, 1856, Senator Charles Sumner, an antislavery
Republican from Massachusetts, delivered an explosive speech,
pleading that the Kansas territory should be admitted to the Union as a
free state.73 In the course of his fiery presentation, Senator Sumner
identified two Democratic colleagues as the principal culprits of a
“Crime Against Kansas”74 which “compel[ed] it to the hateful embrace
of slavery”—Stephen Douglas of Illinois and Andrew Butler of South
Carolina.75
Shortly after the Senate had adjourned for the day, Congressman
Preston Brooks of South Carolina entered the chamber, and approached
Senator Sumner at his desk.76 Congressman Brooks was a close friend
of Senator Butler and had not taken kindly to Senator Sumner’s attack
on his fellow statesman.77 With little warning, Congressman Brooks
proceeded to strike Senator Sumner repeatedly over the head with his

70. Id. at ix.
71. Friedland, supra note 8, at 175.
72. The Caning of Senator Charles Sumner, UNITED STATES SENATE (May 22, 1856),
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/The_Caning_of_Senator_Charles_Sum
ner.htm [hereinafter Sumner Caning].
73. Id.
74. Charles Sumner, The Crime Against Kansas, DIGITAL HISTORY (May 19-20, 1856),
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=3915.
75. Id. (In the speech, Senator Sumner labeled Senator Douglas a “noise-some, squat,
and nameless animal” and compared Senator Butler’s support of slavery with taking "a
mistress . . . who, though ugly to others, is always lovely to him.”); see Sumner Caning, supra
note 72.
76. Id.
77. Towner, supra note 55, at 74.

308

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:58

metal-topped cane.78 Stunned, Senator Sumner “rose and lurched
blindly about the chamber, futilely attempting to protect himself.”79 The
episode ended quickly, with Senator Sumner carried away, bleeding
from the head and Congressman Brooks calmly exiting the Senate
chamber.80 Meanwhile, “[t]he nation, suffering from the breakdown of
reasoned discourse that this event symbolized, tumbled onward toward
the catastrophe of civil war.”81
The caning episode paled in comparison to the argument between
Senators Henry S. Foote of Mississippi and Thomas H. Benton of
Missouri six years earlier. By at least one account, their antics qualified
as “[p]robably the most serious scene of disorder that ever occurred in
the Senate.”82 After Senator Foote publicly denounced Senator Benton,
the Missourian “suddenly rose and started toward the speaker in a
belligerent manner.”83 Senator Foote “drew a large pistol from his hippocket, and flourished it at Benton.”84 After the Senate was thrown into
an uproar, tempers were settled and the pistol was locked away by the
sergeant-at-arms.85
Yet another violent episode involved Senators John L. McLaurin
and Benjamin R. Tillman of South Carolina:
On February 22, 1902, the Senate debated a bill relating to the
Philippine Islands. Benjamin Tillman, known to be less than
courteous on the Senate floor, used the occasion to direct scathing
remarks toward John McLaurin's empty chair, charging that his
colleague had succumbed to ‘improper influences’ in changing his
position on the treaty to annex the Philippines . . . Word of Tillman's
remarks quickly reached McLaurin in a committee meeting and,
incensed, he dashed into the Senate Chamber and denounced
Tillman's statement as ‘a willful, malicious, and deliberate lie.’ 86

Challenged by his colleague, Senator Tillman physically attacked
Senator McLaurin, landing a “series of stinging blows” before efforts to
separate the two legislators “resulted in misdirected punches landing on

78. Sumner Caning, supra note 72; see also Towner, supra note 55 (“without warning
Brooks began to beat [Sumner] violently over the head”).
79. Sumner Caning, supra note 72.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Towner, supra note 55, at 74.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (recounting the episode).
86. The Censure Case of John L. McLaurin and Benjamin R. Tillman of South Carolina
(1902), UNITED STATES SENATE (Feb. 28, 1902), https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/censure_cases/090Tillman_Laurin.htm [hereinafter Censure Case].
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other members.”87 Following the melee and a two-hour debate in closed
session, both Senators were declared in contempt of the Senate and “later
in the afternoon, both of them apologized to the august assembly.”88 The
apologies of Senators Tillman and McLaurin were handled “in such
unpleasant and bitter terms that the ruckus threatened to explode
anew.”89 This violent breach of comity prompted members of the Senate
to reexamine their rules in an effort to enforce “stricter guidelines for the
decorum of floor debate.”90
C. Stricter Guidelines for Senate Decorum – The Introduction of Rule
XIX
On August 8, 1902, the Senate adopted Rule XIX(2),91 requiring
that, “[n]o Senator in debate shall, directly or indirectly, by any form of
words impute to another Senator or to other Senators any conduct or
motive unworthy or unbecoming a Senator.”92 A contemporary critique
charged that “[u]nder this rule personalities are severely suppressed
whenever they are resorted to in debate.”93 In fact, the accounts of
sample precedents where senators were declared out of order most often
included cases described as the “lie indirect,” similar to Senator Thomas
Benton’s accusation that Senator John C. Calhoun’s speech represented
“a bold attack upon the truth.”94 Other early examples cited by the
commentator of words to be deemed out of order in the Senate included
Senator Dolliver’s characterization of the Democratic members of the
chamber as a “syndicate of vituperation” and Senator Zacharaiah
Chandler’s declaration that certain members gained their seats “by fraud
and violence.”95
D. Invocations of Rule XIX
Following its adoption, Rule XIX remained in relative obscurity,
and largely without incident, for more than three-quarters of a century.
Then, in June 1979, Republican Senator John Heinz, of Pennsylvania,
87. Id.
88. Id.; John Elfreth Watkins, The Quarrels of Congress: The Tillman-McLaurin Battle,
3 THE SCRAP BOOK 219 (1907).
89. See Censure Case, supra note 86.
90. Id.
91. See generally Lily Rothman, The Fistfight Behind the Rule That Silenced Elizabeth
Warren, as Described in 1902, TIME (Feb. 8, 2017), http://time.com/4663698/elizabethwarren-rule-xix-history/ (describing Senator George Hoar’s introduction of what became Rule
XIX(2)).
92. S. Res. 285, 113th Cong. Rule XIX (2013) (enacted).
93. Towner, supra note 55, at 74.
94. Id. (recounting the episode).
95. Id.
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halted debate in the Senate chamber after his Republican colleague,
Senator Lowell Weicker, of Connecticut, referred to him as “an idiot”
and labelled him “devious.”96
During heated debate over an
appropriations bill, Senator Weicker attempted to eliminate $13 million
in proposed loan guarantees to the Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Co., a
company located in Senator Heinz’s home state.97 Senator Heinz’s
comments on the Senate floor implied that Senator Weicker might be
“acting on behalf of another steel mill.”98 The insinuation angered the
Connecticut senator, who rose to his feet to respond: “[w]hen a member
substitutes innuendo for fact or the persuasion of logic . . . he is either an
idiot or devious and the senator from Pennsylvania qualifies in both
ways.”99
Senator Heinz marched to the Senate president's desk with the
Senate rule book in hand.100 After Senator Heinz cited Rule XIX to the
presiding senator, Senator Weicker was directed to sit down, in
accordance with the rule.101 Accounts suggest that more than ten
minutes of confusion ensued before Democratic Senate Majority Leader
Robert Byrd brought the two men together to shake hands and make halfhearted non-apologies, before debate resumed, and the incident was
stricken from the Senate record.102 By best evidence, the incident
involving Senators Weicker and Heinz marked the first invocation of
Rule XIX in the Senate’s history. And, while the rule and its full remedy
would not again be implicated until the recent episode involving Senator
Warren and Majority Leader McConnell, it would be cited and its
invocation threatened several times in the years that followed.
Just two years later, in 1981, Senator Lowell Weicker again found
96. Senate Dispute Over Steel Mill Bill Degenerates to Name-calling Spat, DAILY
IOWAN, Jun. 26, 1979, at A3, http://dailyiowan.lib.uiowa.edu/DI/1979/di1979-06-26.pdf
(“Before the smoke cleared, Weicker said Heinz was either an ‘idiot’ or ‘devious’—very
probably both.”).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting from the Senate proceedings); Standing Rules of the United States
Senate, Rule XIX, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Standing_Rules_of_the_United_States_Senate,_Rule_XIX (last visited May 22, 2018).
100. Id.
101. Id. (“Heinz then got out a rule book, took the floor and used Senate regulations to
force Weicker to sit down.”). Notably, the rule’s remedy is wholly consistent by that first
suggested by section 17.11 of Thomas Jefferson’s Manual. See discussion supra Section II.A.
102. See Andrew J. Tobias, Arcane Senate Rule Used to Silence Elizabeth Warren Has
Been Mentioned Frequently Through The Years, But Rarely Used, CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 8,
2017, 5:17 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/02/arcane_senate_rule_u
sed_to_sil.html (“After about 10 minutes, Democratic Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd
got both men to shake hands, and debate resumed. The incident was stricken from the Senate
record.”).
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himself at the center of a Rule XIX controversy following his long
oratory aimed at blocking the expected final approval of a Congressional
limitation on the Justice Department’s participation in school busing
cases.103 After an impassioned and stirring presentation during which
the Connecticut Senator roared that “[d]emagoguery is afoot” and paced
about the Senate chamber, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina
objected, asserting that Senator Weicker had impugned his motives in
violation of Rule XIX.104 Idaho Republican Senator James McClure,
then presiding over the Senate, proceeded to “read a rule stating that no
senator in a debate can ‘impute to the motives of another senator any
conduct or motive unbecoming a senator.’ ” 105 Accounts of the episode
provide no further description, and, in time, Senator Weicker’s
legislative tactics proved unsuccessful, as the Senate passed a cloture
vote on the measure he opposed several months later.106
One of the more colorful incidents involving Senate Rule XIX
occurred in 1992 when the Senate’s senior Democrat, Robert Byrd, “got
into a dispute with Sen. Hank Brown R-Colo., a supporter of the
balanced-budget amendment.”107 Senator Brown complained of
excessive government spending and labeled the Appropriations
Committee, chaired by Senator Byrd, as “the most irresponsible
appropriations committee in the history of our republic.”108 Matching
the hyperbole, Senator Byrd rose to his feet to call Senator Brown’s
comments “as irresponsible a statement as I have ever heard in my 34
years in the Senate.”109 Senator Byrd raised the stakes, “read[ing] aloud
from a June 15 letter Brown had sent Byrd asking that the appropriations
panel provide him with millions of dollars for special projects in
Colorado.”110 Senator D’Amato of New York entered the fray, accusing
Senator Byrd of violating Rule XIX. After Senator Byrd denied the
103. See Francis X. Clines, Weicker Uses Oratory in Bid to Stall a Busing Curb, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 17, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/17/us/weicker-uses-oratory-in-bidto-stall-a-busing-curb.html (“The legislation would stop the Justice Department from ‘any sort
of action to require directly or indirectly’ school busing beyond the school nearest a student’s
home except for the physically or mentally handicapped.”).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Steven V. Roberts, Senate, 61-36, Ends Filibuster on Busing Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
(Sep. 17, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/09/17/us/senate-61-36-ends-filibuster-onbusing-issue.html (commenting that “the vote to end the filibuster, which carried by 61 votes
to 36, clearly indicated that a majority of the Senate was ready to end busing as a means of
achieving racially balanced schools”).
107. See Byrd in Floor Spat Said ‘Shut Mouth’, INDIANA GAZETTE 14 (Jun. 27, 1992),
https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/14043113/.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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charge, “there ensued an extraordinary shouting match between the two
senators that saw Senator Byrd ask his colleague from New York,
‘Would the senator shut his own mouth to let the chair rule?’ ” 111 The
chair found no violation, and the Senate resumed debate “in its usual
decorous manner.”112
In February 1995, during debate over a balanced budget
amendment to the Constitution, Senator Byrd accused his Republican
colleagues of “a sleazy, tawdry effort to win a victory” after the
Republican Leader, Senator Bob Dole, reneged on a promise to vote on
the measure and, instead gaveled the chamber into recess.113 “I think
my colleague from West Virginia came close, if not a violation of Rule
19,” Senator Dole said on the Senate floor the next day, before reading
the relevant portion of Rule XIX aloud and commenting that the
“tawdry” and “sleazy” references were “uncalled for.”114
On November 16, 2005, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska complained
that “[i]t has been brought to my attention that the Senator from Illinois
unfairly maligned my character in direct violation of rule XIX of the
Standing Rules of the Senate.”115 Senator Stevens was bristling at
Senator Durbin’s suggestion that he had purposely avoided swearing in
witnesses before a joint hearing of the Senate Commerce and Energy
Committees. “To suggest I did not administer an oath to these witnesses
to help them lie to Members of Congress is false, inexcusable, and in
violation of rule XIX, the longstanding practice of Senatorial courtesy,
and I expect an apology from the Senator from Illinois,” Senator Stevens
bawled.116 The record is unclear as to whether such an apology was ever
extended.
In 2007, Majority Leader Harry Reid drew the ire of Senator Arlen
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Michael Wines, Republicans Postpone a Balanced-Budget Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 1, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/01/us/the-104th-congress-balancedbudget-republicans-postpone-a-balanced-budget-vote.html?pagewanted=all.
114. See Balanced Budget Amendment, C-SPAN (Mar. 1, 1995), at 8:34 et seq.,
https://www.c-span.org/video/?63648-1/balanced-budget-amendment. But see 141 CONG.
REC. S18969 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Sen. Byrd), 141 Cong Rec S 18969,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1995-12-20/pdf/CREC-1995-12-20-pt1PgS18969.pdf (Sen. Byrd defending his comments, several months later, following a long
oratory on Senate civility: “I am very careful, I try to be careful, and sometimes I speak in
haste. And subsequent to that remark on this very floor one evening, I referred to my having
spoken in haste, and to my having used some words, which I wish I had chosen differently.
So nobody needs to remind this Senator as to what this Senator has said. I am ready to defend
anything I say”).
115. See 145 CONG. REC. S12899 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1999) (statement of Mr. Lot), 145
Cong Rec S 12899.
116. See id.
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Specter, then a Republican, of Pennsylvania. Frustrated by entrenched
Republican opposition to the Democrats plan for altering the Alternative
Minimum Tax, the Senator from Nevada had quipped that “President
Bush is the man that’s pulling the strings on the 49 puppets he has
here.”117 Not content to let the comment stand unchallenged, Senator
Specter accused the Majority Leader of violating Rule XIX, adding that
the puppet label represented “a term of derision” and a “a term of
ridicule.”118
E. Recent Rule XIX Forbearance
In recent history, three contentious incidents which passed without
reference to Rule XIX are also of note. First, in 2004, as one newspaper
account reported, “[a] brief argument between Vice President Cheney
and a senior Democratic senator led Cheney to utter a big-time obscenity
on the Senate floor.”119 While Vice President Cheney was in the Senate
chamber for photographs, he engaged in a heated argument with Senator
Patrick Leahy, the Vermont Democrat and Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee.120 In comments that the Vice President’s spokesman
characterized as a “frank exchange of views,” the Vice President
instructed Senator Leahy to “[f]**k yourself.”121 As the Senate was not
in session, rule XIX was likely inapplicable.122 In July 2015, Senator
McConnell might have had cause to invoke Rule XIX against a fellow
Republican, Senator Ted Cruz after the Texan accused Senator
McConnell, the leader of his own party, of lying “over and over and over
again” with respect to a vote on the Export-Import Bank.123 According
to press reports, Senator McConnell “ignored Cruz’s diatribe and
pointedly did not respond to it when he spoke on the Senate floor later
in the day.”124 In May 2016, Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas offered a
stinging attack of Minority Leader Harry Reid in comments unusual for
117. See Matthew Hay Brown, Specter: You Take That Back, Harry Reid, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Dec. 5, 2007, 9:08 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/chinews-mtblog-200712-specter_you_take_that_back_har-story.html.
118. Id. (also quoting Senator Specter as commenting that “[i]t is my view that being
called a puppet is in direct violation of the rule”).
119. Helen Dewar & Dana Milbank, Cheney Dismisses Critic with Obscenity, WASH.
POST (Jun. 25, 2004), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/06/25/cheneydismisses-critic-with-obscenity/03c4e75d-3c1f-43d5-9173-791ff4d49220/.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Russell Berman, Ted Cruz’s Cry for Attention, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 24, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/ted-cruz-mitch-mcconnell-donaldtrump-liar-senate/399590/.
124. Id.
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a freshman Senator.125 “I'm forced to listen to the bitter, vulgar,
incoherent ramblings of the minority leader,” Senator Cotton charged.126
As one newspaper account described, Senator Cotton “smashed through
decorum on the typically reserved Senate floor” to attack the leadership
of the retiring Senator from Nevada, offering that “the happy by-product
of fewer days in session in the Senate is that this institution will be cursed
less with his cancerous leadership.”127 The incident passed without any
reference to Rule XIX.
Decorum within the upper chamber of a nation’s legislative body is
a noble goal. And, the reverence for the institution shared by its
members is admirable.128 The desire for collegiality within the Senate
chamber traces its roots to the first days of the republic.129 It also
represents a prerequisite for any effectively functioning legislature.130
Rule XIX is far from the only tool available to enforce that civility. In
fact, its history suggests that it plays something less than a meaningful
role in the process. Adopted in 1902, the rule was not employed until
1979. And, until the most recent incident surrounding the nomination of
Senator Sessions, Rule XIX had not been used to gain advantage in
125. See Amber Phillips, Sen. Tom Cotton Really, Really, Really Doesn’t Like Harry Reid,
WASH. POST (May 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/05/2
5/sen-tom-cotton-really-really-really-doesnt-like-harry-reid/?utm_term=.140508a0f173
(describing the incident).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC: ADDRESSES ON
THE HISTORY OF ROMAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 (1995) (quoting former Vice President
Aaron Burr, upon exiting the Senate as observing “[t]his house is a sanctuary; a citadel of law,
of order, and of liberty; and it is here—it is here, in this exalted refuge; here, if anywhere, will
resistance be made to the storms of political phrensy and the silent arts of corruption; and if
the Constitution be destined ever to perish by the sacrilegious hand of the demagogue or
usurper, which God avert, its expiring agonies will be witnessed on this floor.”); see also
GEORGE HENRY HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE
vii (1938) (quoting William Gladstone as labeling the U.S. Senate “that remarkable body, the
most remarkable of all the inventions of modern politics”).
129. See generally Orrin G. Hatch, I am Re-Committing to Civility, TIME (Jun. 28, 2017),
http://time.com/4835019/orrin-hatch-civility-politics/ (“Civility is the indispensable political
norm. It is the public virtue that has greased the wheels of our democracy since its inception.”).
130. See Remarks by Senator Robert Byrd, supra note 55 (observing that “bipartisanship
and comity [are] necessary if members wish to accomplish much of anything”).
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legislative debate or on any question before the body. Instead, its
function had been limited to the means by which Senators respected one
another within the chamber. In that regard, the most recent invocation
of the rule represents a new and unwelcome development.
F. In Defense of the Senate as an Institution
Over the Senate’s history, various highly respected Senators have
addressed the chamber in defense of the institution, and its values, mores
and customs. Such orations have often been delivered at times of
heightened emotion in the legislative process or upon a significant
retirement. Perhaps the first such soaring oration was offered by Senator
Henry Clay upon his retirement from the Senate in 1842. Known as his
Valedictory to the Senate, Senator Clay’s words offered great
collegiality and warmth:
At the time of my entry into this body, . . . I regarded it, and still
regard it, as a body which may be compared, without disadvantage,
to any of a similar character which has existed in ancient or modern
times. . .
[D]uring my long and arduous services in the public councils, and
especially . . . in the Senate, the same ardor of temperament has
characterized my actions, and has no doubt led me, in the heat of
debate . . . to use language offensive and susceptible of ungracious
interpretation towards my brother senators.
If there be any who entertain a feeling of dissatisfaction resulting
from any circumstance of this kind, I beg to assure them that I now
make the amplest apology . . . I assure the Senate, one and all,
without exception and without reserve, that I leave the Senate
Chamber without carrying with me to my retirement a single feeling
of dissatisfaction towards the Senate itself or any one of its members.
I go from it under the hope that we shall mutually consign to
perpetual oblivion whatever of personal animosities or jealousies
may have arisen between us during the repeated collisions of mind
with mind.131

Also among the Senate’s ablest members and its most celebrated
defenders was Robert Byrd, the longest serving member of the chamber
in the nation’s history132 and one who “forced the Senate to grapple with
its history, specific duties, and unique place in the architecture of the
131. Civility in the Senate – Henry Clay’s Valedictory to the Senate, UNITED STATES
SENATE (Mar. 31, 1842), https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/idea_of_the_senate/
1842Clay.htm.
132. See Caitlin Taylor and Huma Khan, Robert C. Byrd, Senate’s Longest Serving
Member, Dead at 92, ABC NEWS (Jun. 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/robertbyrd-dead-92-senates-longest-serving-senator/story?id=6692830.
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Madisonian separation of powers.”133 In one particularly stirring
speech, Senator Byrd took to the floor to ask his colleagues “[h]ave
civility and common courtesy and reasonableness taken leave of this
Chamber?”134 In a talk filled with historical reference and sprinkled with
instruction on Senatorial heritage and ritual, the white haired West
Virginian challenged legislators to “rein in our tongues and lower our
voices and speak to each other and about each other in a more civil
fashion?”135 Senator Byrd ended his lesson on civility with the soaring
rhetoric that had become his calling card, offering colleagues his wish
for the future of his beloved Senate:
may a temperate spirit return to this chamber and may it again reign
in our public debates and political discourses, that the great eagle in
our nation seal may continue to look toward the sun with piercing
eyes that survey, with majestic grace, all who come within the scope
and shadow of its mighty wings.136

Taken as a whole, those episodes implicating and threatening to
implicate Rule XIX are of little precedential value. First and foremost,
the rule was not a part of the Senate for its first century. Tellingly, the
Senate managed its affairs and generally maintained its collegiality
during those years, despite a few isolated episodes of fisticuffs and
firearms. Moreover, the rule’s seven-decade dormancy following its
adoption speaks to its irrelevance in the Senate’s daily function for the
better part of two centuries. The rule’s more frequent implication of late
is also of little matter, other than to validate the seeming “normalization
. . . of using the Senate rules as shirts-and-skins exercises.”137 In that
sense, the rule’s newfound relevance serves more as an indictment of the
declining civility in today’s Senate and a reflection of the coarsening of
the broader political culture than of anything else.138 “Politics is now
133. See Senator Ben Sasse’s Maiden Speech, U.S. SENATOR FOR NEBRASKA BEN SASSE
(Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/11/senator-ben-sasse-smaiden-speech [hereinafter Senator Sasse’s Maiden Speech].
134. See generally Helen Dewar, Senate Hears a Word From Byrd on a Manner of
Speaking, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 1995).
135. See 141 CONG. REC. S18965, (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement on civility in the
Senate), 141 Cong Rec S 18965 (reminding colleagues that “[p]olitical partisanship is to be
expected in a legislative body . . . but bitter personal attacks go beyond the pale of respectable
propriety”).
136. Id.
137. See Senator Sasse’s Maiden Speech, supra note 133.
138. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, In Senate, Traditional Decorum Gives Way to New
Discord, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/us/politics/inhidebound-senate-decorum-becomes-less-traditional.html (describing the difficult time faced
by former Senator Hagel at his confirmation hearing to become Secretary of Defense and
observing that “[w]ith the current hyperpartisanship in Washington, the intra-Senate discord
has reached new levels in the usually approbatory chamber in recent months, a place where a
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not just a serious business but a highly polarized one,” and the “core
values that underlie American political culture have atrophied, as have
the associated prescriptions for action (norms) in the society.”139
The uneven nature of Rule XIX’s invocation also undermines any
meaningful support for its responsible use as a tactical legislative cudgel.
Any support is further strained against the gravity of the occasion of the
nomination of a sitting senator for a position requiring the Senatorial
advice and consent prescribed by Article II. Until the events surrounding
the Senator Sessions nomination, Rule XIX had been little more than a
parliamentary tool available when Senatorial vitriol had violated a
subjective and floating standard or offended a colleague beyond his/her
personal tolerance. The rule lacks meaningful historical significance,
with its incoherent and arbitrary utility offending Jefferson’s paramount
desire that the Senate’s system of rules be free from caprice or passion
in their application.
III. TOWARD A MORE PROPER ARRANGEMENT FOR THE FUTURE
NOMINATION OF A SITTING SENATOR
Today’s Senate is presented with an opportunity to consider the
proper protocol for a future event involving the nomination of a sitting
senator.140 Such consideration is best engaged absent the partisan
energy that often attends a pending nomination fight, and should also be
undertaken with little regard for the majority or minority status of
individual members, as the political party affiliations of presidents and
the Senate majority shift like the wind, and are not relevant to the
procedural foundations of the legislative branch.141 Today’s Senate
ought to restore advice and consent to its rightful place, as “a robust but
controlled check on presidential discretion through due diligence and
certain level of respect for fellow and retired members of the same party is generally more or
less a given”); see also Hatch, supra note 129 (complaining that “[w]hen I first came to
Washington, the culture of Congress was vastly different than it is today,” adding that “[t]here
was a level of respect and congeniality among colleagues that was hard to find anywhere
else”); Edwin J. Feulner, A Renewed Call for Senate Civility, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov.
10, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/political-process/commentary/renewed-call-senatecivility (offering that “there’s something different about today’s poisonous atmosphere” in the
Senate).
139. See ERIC M. USLANER, THE DECLINE OF COMITY IN CONGRESS 1-2 (1993)
(observing too that “[w]e have lost the collective sense of humor that is so necessary to sustain
cordiality and the trust in others that is essential to reciprocity”).
140. See, e.g., Viser & McGrane, supra note 6 (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah:
“[e]verything doesn’t have to lead to a gut fight on the floor . . . [b]ut that’s where we’re going
. . . [w]e’ve got to grow up.”).
141. See, e.g., Remarks by Senator Robert Byrd, supra note 55 (noting in 1996, that
“[s]ince the Republican Party was created in 1854, the Senate has changed hands 14 times”).
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individualized public evaluation, while also ensuring that its own rules
do not get in the way of a timely and effective process.”142 To anoint
the objective of Senate comity as on par with the Constitutional charge
of advice and consent is a mistake, and represents a false equivalence.
The latter embodies the considered handiwork of the Framers, enshrined
in the Constitution. It also animates their intentional and considerable
effort to establish the proper balance and mutual function of two
branches and “to promote a judicious choice of men for filling the offices
of the Union.”143 Careful examination exposes the former as a mere rule
respecting an uneven and inconsistent tradition of convenience,
accommodation and privilege for the Senate’s members. Failing to
assert, reestablish and maintain a more proper balance in the wake of the
recent incident would represent a meaningful failure of the Senate. A
deliberate consideration and articulation of the proper interplay of advice
and consent with Rule XIX is important to both the execution of the
Senate’s proper role in the appointments process and to Senate comity.
Challenged with striking harmony between the appropriate level of
investigation of presidential nominees and the long-held tradition of
Senate comity, the Senate might chart any one of several courses.
Whatever path it chooses, the upper chamber must remain steadfast to
its Constitutional assignment, as the Framers’ allocation of an activity to
one branch of government rather than to another represents a purposeful
choice and is “critical to maintaining the rule of law, the accountability
of officials, and the efficiency of government.”144
A. The Possibility of Embracing the Status Quo
The Senate might reject tradition and reason and favor collegiality
within its chamber as paramount, opting for no change to a system that
would presumably enforce a Rule XIX challenge should an episode
similar to the Senator Sessions nomination again arise. It is an
unfortunate reality that such inaction might represent the Senate’s most
likely course of action, as a body at rest tends to stay at rest.145 As some
commentators have suggested, the legislature has increasingly reclined
142. Friedland, supra note 8, at 175.
143. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
144. William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the
Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 267 (1989); see also Volokh, supra note 30, at 75051 (“If a procedure embodies a careful set of checks and balances, deviating from the
procedure upsets the Framers’ intended allocation of power between the branches of
government.”).
145. See generally Newton’s First Law, THE PHYSICS CLASSROOM,
http://www.physicsclassroom.com/class/newtlaws/Lesson-1/Newton-s-First-Law
(describing Newton’s law of inertia).
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toward a reactive posture, addressing issues only after circumstances
absolutely dictate legislative attention.146 In this case, Senate inaction
would be unwise, as it would frustrate the proper function of separation
of powers and would represent an abdication of the traditional Senatorial
responsibility to provide the president with the benefit of the proper level
of advice and consent with respect to his nominees.147
Of note, comity is not the only Senate tradition due consideration
in reviewing the most recent Rule XIX invocation. By truncating a
colleague’s argument, Senator McConnell also frustrated, by some
measure, the Senate’s traditional preference for extended debate.148
While the Senate has abandoned the romantic notion that such
inclination could be without limit,149 in recent years, Senator McConnell
himself has signaled a great affinity for the tradition.150 Such a
principled position is difficult to square with the Majority Leader’s
tactics in respect of Senator Sessions’ nomination.
Objections and political posturing aside, the Senate also has a
tradition of deferring to executive nominees.151 Cabinet level rejections

146. See, e.g., THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 7, 15 (2006)
(suggesting that Congress looks “like an arm of the Second Branch, a supine, reactive body
more eager to submit to presidential directives than to assert its own prerogatives”).
147. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
148. See, e.g., Remarks by Senator Robert Byrd, supra note 55 (“The Senate was intended
to be a forum for open and free debate and for the protection of political minorities.”); see
also Towner, supra note 55, at 77 (observing, prior to certain rule changes of more recent
vintage that “[i]t is, of course, only consistent with Senatorial dignity that a member should
be allowed to speak as long as he chooses, and the rules give this privilege to every Senator”).
149. For example, pursuant to precedent established on November 21, 2013, the Senate
can invoke cloture on nominations other than those to the U.S. Supreme Court by a majority
of Senators voting (a quorum being present). See, e.g., VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43331, MAJORITY CLOTURE FOR NOMINATIONS: IMPLICATIONS AND
THE “NUCLEAR” PROCEEDINGS (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43331.pdf.
150. At significant political cost to himself and Senate colleagues of his party, Senator
McConnell has resisted calls to drop the threshold for cloture votes from its current sixty vote
level to a simple majority. See generally Matt Korade, Trump Blasts Senate Rules in Saturday
Morning Tweets, CNN (Jul. 29, 2017, 9:10 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/29/politics/
trump-health-care-senate-votes-tweet/index.html (summarizing various tweets from President
Trump attacking Senator McConnell’s inability to change Senate rules to push the President’s
agenda); cf. Michael McAuliff & Jennifer Bendery, Mitch McConnell Goes ‘Nuclear’ To
Break Supreme Court Filibuster, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2017, 12:08 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/republicans-nuclear-option_us_58e664ace4b0589471
5eabda (describing the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court and the procedure
by which Senator McConnell changed Senate rules to require “51 votes to advance a Supreme
Court nominee”).
151. Weaver, supra note 23, at 1730 (asserting that, generally, the Senate has been
“relatively deferential” to the President’s nominations, especially in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries”).
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have been particularly rare. 152 According to the Senate’s own archives,
in the nation’s history, only nine Cabinet nominees have been rejected
by the Senate.153 The last such rejection occurred in 1989, following
President George H. W. Bush’s selection of John Tower for the post of
Secretary of Defense.154 Tower had served twenty-four years in the
Senate before retiring in 1985, and “[d]uring those years his Senate
colleagues came to resent his abrasive manner.”155 After Tower’s
opponents built a “case against his character rather than his
competence,” which included evidence of “womanizing, abuse of
alcohol, and questionable financial dealings with defense contractors,
the Senate engaged” in a fractious debate before rejecting the nomination
by a forty-seven to fifty-three vote.156 Today, Tower remains both the
only “nominee of a new president's initial cabinet ever to be rejected,”
and the only “former Senator to be turned down by his former colleagues
for a cabinet post.”157
In the years following the unsuccessful nomination of former
Senator Tower and preceding the nomination of Senator Sessions, the
Senate has also considered the nominations of former colleagues John
Ashcroft and Chuck Hagel as Attorney General and Secretary of
Defense, respectively.158 Both men were treated to rather hostile
receptions upon their return to the Senate chamber, before obtaining the
consent of their former colleagues.159
152. There have been nine candidates for Cabinet posts rejected by the Senate and an
additional fourteen nominations withdrawn. See Unsuccessful nominations to the Cabinet of
the United States, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unsuccessful_nominations_to_
the_Cabinet_of_the_United_States (last visited Feb. 4, 2018). For the story of the first such
rejection, see First Cabinet Rejection, UNITED STATES SENATE (Jun. 24, 1834),
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/First_Cabinet_Rejection.htm; see also
Elizabeth King, This is What Happened Last Time a Cabinet Nomination Was Rejected, TIME
(Feb. 3, 2017), http://time.com/4653593/cabinet-rejection-john-tower/ (summarizing the
episode of Senator Tower’s unsuccessful nomination to the post of Secretary of Defense in
1989 and noting that “the President usually gets his way when it comes to his cabinet
appointees”).
153. See Cabinet Nominations Rejected, United States Senate (last visited Feb. 4, 2018),
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Nominations.htm#10.
154. Ed O’Keefe and David Weigel, In Sessions hearing, ‘senatorial courtesy’ is lost in
the tumult of Trump, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017) (“The last Cabinet nominee to lose a highprofile confirmation battle, in 1989, was former Texas senator John Tower).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (describing the Senate’s reaction to the nominations of former colleagues Chuck
Hagel and John Ashcroft).
159. See, e.g., Jessica Reaves, Ashcroft Hearings Start with a Bang, TIME (Jan. 16, 2001),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,95433,00.html (“Never far beneath all the
gentlemanly back-patting and hand-shaking, a deep vein of hostility surfaced on the first
afternoon of John Ashcroft’s confirmation hearing.”); Jeremy W. Peters, Hagel Approved for
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Politically, the choice for status quo is unappealing for the Senate,
as it would ensure contentious hearings involving the future nominations
of sitting senators. Such a scenario might prove frustrating to the
nominated senator, and to both those Senate colleagues in favor of and
opposed to the nomination. Maintaining the existing threat of Rule XIX
as a tactic to be employed in a manner echoing the most recent affair, in
and of itself, seems destructive to Senate amity. Senatorial action is
necessary to eliminate any possibility that the rule’s most recent usage
might represent the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent. Senators
should also consider that there is no assurance that the Senate will be
controlled by the President’s same political party. In such a case, the
tactical invocation of Rule XIX might be unavailable to extinguish an
attack from senators opposed to a President’s nominee, creating the
inverse scenario of the Senator Sessions episode, but likely to be no less
deleterious to both Senate comity and to the effective administration of
advice and consent.
B. The Possibility of Waiving the Rule XIX Protections
As a second option, the Senate might establish an express
preference for its advice and consent role by adopting a rule whereby
any senator nominated for a position requiring advice and consent
waives the protection afforded by Rule XIX in favor of a more fulsome
inquiry into his/her fitness for the nominated office. Presumably, such a
mechanism could be instituted via simple appendage to the existing Rule
XIX framework. By adopting a rule that a sitting senator nominated for
a post requiring advice and consent waives the potential protection of
Rule XIX with respect to matters involving his/her nomination, the
Senate would signal a fidelity to the Senate’s Constitutionally-charged
role as a check on presidential prerogative over the inconvenience or
embarrassment that might attach to a single senator-turned-nominee.
Notably, such a structure would be wholly consistent with the first
hundred years of the republic, where there was no rule available to shield
a senator-turned-nominee from attack. Under such a structure, the
unavailability of Rule XIX style protection would also be known in
advance, and could be weighed by the president in selecting nominees.
Defense in Sharply Split Senate Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/us/politics/hagel-filibuster-defense-senateconfirmation.html (describing former Senator Hagel’s confirmation process as an “unusually
contentious nomination fight, one that surprised many in Washington for how personal and
bitter it became, considering that Mr. Hagel worked alongside many of his antagonists until
just four years ago”).
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Considered at a moment of relative calm, and away from a slew of
pending nominations, such a rule might enjoy broad appeal within the
Senate. If adopted, a subsequent senator-nominee would be no less
advantaged than any non-senator-nominee for whom no such protection
is available.160
A variation on the Rule XIX waiver would leave the existing Rule
XIX unaltered, but have the Senate adopt an expressed preference that
any nominee from within the Senate for a post requiring advice and
consent voluntarily waive the Rule XIX protection upon his/her
nomination. Such a sense of the Senate would put the onus on a
nominated senator to affirmatively signal his/her own preference for
Constitutional fidelity over personal convenience, or to reject both the
Senate’s Constitutional responsibility and its stated predilection in one
fell swoop. It is reasonable to assume that waivers by nominated
senators in such a regime would be routinely provided, and each such
waiver would signal a willingness to absorb the inconvenience and
personal embarrassment that might result from the attack by Senate
colleagues in favor of ensuring that the Senate is free to conduct an
inquiry as faithful to Constitutional design and thorough as that provided
any other nominee.
Regardless of the Senate’s chosen approach, the chamber and the
public would both benefit from a robust and wholesome discussion of
the wisdom of the current system which seems to afford a sitting senator
more protections than any other nominee simply by virtue of his/her
senatorial status.161 Also, regardless of whichever course of action the
Senate chooses, it might be wise to consider an agreement in advance
that the hearings for sitting Senators nominated to positions requiring
advice and consent be conducted in private.162 By removing such an
inquiry from contemporaneous public view and in an accommodation to
comity, the potential negative effects of any aggressive challenge by
160. The fact that the tactical application of Rule XIX might provide a potential advantage
for nominees from within the Senate is particularly unpleasing given the somewhat related
considerations of the Constitution’s Article I, Section 6: “No Senator or Representative shall,
during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority
of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have
been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
6.
161. Notably, Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution expressly rejects special treatment
for sitting legislators, albeit in a slightly different context. Id.
162. Interestingly, “[t]he first sessions of the Senate were held entirely behind closed
doors” and there were “no galleries and no provision for outsiders.” See Towner, supra note
55, at 73 (noting that “[t]reaties and confirmations of Presidential appointments have always
been considered behind closed doors”).
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Senate colleagues would likely be substantially reduced. Any such
decision would necessarily put a nominee from within the Senate on an
unequal footing with more pedestrian nominees and must also be
weighed against the clubby appearance it fosters and against the
educational and transparency benefits of conducting such inquiries in
full view of the public.163
CONCLUSION
Whatever course of action or inaction the Senate may choose, the
events surrounding the Senator Sessions nomination have uncovered an
unpleasant reality.164 Whether by design, political expedience or
emotion, today’s version of the world’s most deliberative body has
allowed a simple rule of conduct and decorum to distend beyond a
Constitutional prerogative. Such a regime must be extinguished before
it advances. The future use of Rule XIX as a cudgel must be prohibited
as contrary to the vision of the Framers. The weaponization of a simple
rule of decorum is as inefficient as it is unbecoming and it cannot be
allowed to stand. Rule XIX’s most recent incarnation represents an
abdication of Senatorial responsibility—and, one of the Senate’s own
making. By legislative contrivance, the most recent tactical invocation
of Rule XIX created an opportunity to thwart the fulsome investigation
of a nominee for federal office. Troublingly, the precedent breathes
possibility into a fear given little likelihood by the Framers:
Though it might therefore be allowable to suppose that the Executive
might occasionally influence some individuals in the Senate, yet the
supposition, that he could in general purchase the integrity of the
whole body, would be forced and improbable.165

The process of advice and consent need not descend in a downward
spiral. As one optimistic commentator has observed with respect to
judicial nominations, “there have been times, including in the recent
past, when voices of restraint in the process of confirmation have been
deeply respected by the world’s greatest deliberative body.”166 Those
163. See generally Donald R. Matthews, The Folkways of the United States Senate:
Conformity to Group Norms and Legislative Effectiveness, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1064
(1959) (referring to the Senate as a “club” and commenting that “there are unwritten but
generally accepted and informally enforced norms of conduct in the chamber”).
164. See, e.g., Steven T. Dennis & Chris Strohm, Warren’s Speech Goes Viral After GOP
Tries to Silence Her, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-02-08/gop-silences-warren-as-senate-debate-over-sessions-turns-bitter
(arguing that “[t]he Warren episode . . . marked a new low in a bitter Senate debate over
Trump’s Cabinet nominees”).
165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
166. Kenneth W. Starr, Legislative Restraint in the Confirmation Process, 38 U. RICH. L.

324

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:58

voices of restraint must again be raised.
The path to rectifying the most recent tint on the Senate’s business
is not a difficult one. But, it requires the foresight to anticipate a similar
set of events in the future and the courage to re-establish Constitutional
priorities. Senators must confront the reality that reasserting the proper
balance in this realm means that a sitting senator nominated to an
executive post may, in the future, be at some risk of being traduced by
his/her colleagues.167 Such a task is best addressed prospectively and in
the abstract, before the reputation or good character of any particular
member is under current threat. It is hoped that this Article may, in some
small way, encourage the Senate to embrace its Constitutional charge
over its comity, and to move toward ensuring that its advice and consent
power does not again take a seat to the opportunistic employ of Senate
rules.

REV. 597, 602 (2004).
167. At least one commentator has suggestion that, absent a change to Rule XIX,
“presidents should be barred from nominating sitting Senators for cabinet positions.” This
position seems motivated by the partisan politics of the day and is both hostile to executive
prerogative and wrongheaded. See Libbe Anne, Amend Rule XIX or Prohibit Sitting Senators
from Being Nominated for Cabinet Positions, PATHEOS (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.patheos.
com/blogs/lovejoyfeminism/2017/02/need-amend-rule-xix-prohibit-sitting-senatorsnominated-cabinet-positions.html#1JOh0j4F011m9oZO.99.

